At the end of March, hot news about restoring diplomatic ties between Iran and Egypt appeared in the international media. This news churned up the international scene’s waters since the general awareness refers to the non-existence of full diplomatic ties since the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 when the relationship between these two countries collapsed. Consequently the relations were officially cut off after the Camp David agreements in the same year due to Egypt's diplomatic ties with Israel, which Iran does not recognize. Despite the fact that the establishment of full diplomatic relations and the appointment of new Ambassadors was later denied by both countries, an interesting debate may occur once the manner of this news’ depiction is discussed.
One of the first media to announce the change in the Iranian-Egyptian political discourse was the Israeli Haaretz, which put warming ties between Cairo and Tehran, since Hosni Moubarak was toppled, into a direct context with Egypt’s 30-years-lasting support of Israel and the US policy in the Middle East. The article further links this to Egypt’s permission for two Iranian warships to pass through the Suez Canal in February which Israel called a provocation. Such a connection reflects Israel’s fear of changes in the Arabic countries undergoing revolts against authoritarian regimes which, in the case of Egypt, served Israeli interests. A strengthening of ties between Arab countries and an enemy of Israel is further insinuated as buttress for a country which seeks the “collapse of Zionist regime” as expressed by words of the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Thus, the political transformation of Egyptian foreign affairs has become an issue of ostracism in order to depict the ‘new born Egypt’ as a regime supporting extremists of Ahmadinejad’s kind.
A similar connotation might be sensed in the ‘Western’ media which tie changes in Egyptian foreign policy with i) deflection from the West and its political discourse especially in the context of Iranian regime’s securitization, and ii) a consequent destabilization of the region in terms of geopolitical balance shift regarding Israel’s position. This attitude of the Western Media usually adverts to a ‘threat’ of possible rise of extremism and its consequent influence in case of gaining support for the upcoming parliamentary elections in September. However, it rather points at Western countries' fear of losing their impact over Egyptian affairs as such.
From another perspective, certain motives for exaggeration might also be seen beyond Iranian politics, since the information about restoring diplomatic ties between these two countries was firstly released by Iranian newspapers. An indicator of Iranian iterative desire for relations normalization may have been observed in the expression of support to Egyptian revolution which was called a ‘Victory of Islam’ by some Iranian politicians and clerics. Such ligature serves the Iranian Islamic government - weakened by a rise of opposition since The Green Revolution in 2009 - to strengthen its position in the time of revolutionary spillover within the entire region. Nevertheless, rather than a tool of the Iranian government aiming at its domestic politics, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations would start and develop bilateral cooperation in many areas which would bring economic benefits for both states.
Despite different odds over certain political issues, Iranian attempts to cooperate with Egypt have been of a long-term nature. Thus, from Iranian perspective, restoring diplomatic ties is a logical step as expressed by Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki who stated that the relationship is ‘going ahead in a natural way’. Moreover, with Moubarak’s removal Egypt’s government has indicated a change in its political agenda formerly exclusively corresponding with the US interests, and thus, one of the main obstacles to Egyptian-Iranian reconciliation has been surmounted. In addition, such diversion helps Iran corroborate its international position as a state in opposition towards the US. Thus, while on the one hand, the Western and Israeli media depict Egyptian-Iranian re-approach as a threat reminding securitization of the independently developing Egypt; on the other hand, the Iranian media ideologically dependent on the government might have exaggerated the whole issue for the justification of Iranian politics.
Contrary to any possible aims hidden in the manner of covering this news, Egypt’s motives can be far removed from other actors’ explanations. According to the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, this step reflects Egypt’s willingness to open a new page ‘immediately and positively’. However, rather than aiming to establish a ‘US contra-interest’ policy, Egypt follows its own needs and interests such as politico-economical growth which – in case of cooperation with Iran as a strong regional power – would help reach this objective. Moreover, full Egyptian relations with all Middle Eastern countries might play an important role within the framework of geopolitics. By maintenance of its role and power re-emergence in the sense of rise of formerly strong state, Egypt might become a scales’ finger balancing political affairs beyond the region itself. Underestimating the regional element behind policy decisions in favor of a US-centered, or Israel-centered, respectively, explanation is somewhat an unhelpful legacy of the G.W. Bush's administration. Not all actions ought to be approached through the strictly dualistic ‘with us, or against us’ prism that creates enemies where they are not. In spite of the current US president’s displayed effort at shifting the course, such a worldview apparently has not evaporated yet and it is uncertain whether conditions for its mitigation will ever be met.
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